Washington's Right-to-Farm Summary

Washington’s legislators justified the state’s right-to-farm law as preventing “urbanizing areas” from forcing the “premature removal of lands from agricultural uses and timber production.”1 But since first enacting its RTF law in 1979, the state nonetheless has 4 percent fewer farming operations and 11 percent fewer acres of farmland.2 So what does this law do in practice?

Washington’s RTF Law at a Glance

Washington’s RTF law does not provide agriculture any explicit statutory protection from urban sprawl, but courts have used the legislature’s stated purpose to determine the law’s meaning. Like similar RTF laws nationally, Washington’s law centers on protecting agricultural activities and forest practices from nuisance suits when they impact neighboring property, for example through noise or pollution. Specifically, the state defines nuisances as “whatever is injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property.”3

In one case, the Buchanan family farm sued a concentrated animal feeding operation and a meat processing plant on adjacent properties—Simplot Feeders Limited Partnership (Simplot) and Iowa Beef Processing Inc. (IBP)—owned by IBP and Tyson Fresh Meats Inc. The Buchanan family had farmed their 320-acre farm since 1961, when the neighboring property was a rangeland. Since that time, IBP began operating a meat processing and rendering plant, while Simplot developed a CAFO that held over 40,000 cattle.4 The Buchanans sued Simplot and IBP in federal court for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. In terms of trespass, they complained of flies and manure dust that damaged their crops. Under nuisance, they complained about foul and obnoxious odors.

However, the corporate operators attempted to use the RTF law to dismiss the charges against its CAFO and plant. They argued their operations qualified as protected agricultural activities broadly, which Washington’s RTF law defines as inclusive of any conditions or activities that occur within a farm in connection with commercial production of farm products. Specifically, the law defines protected agricultural activities sweepingly, including most everything that occurs on a farm in connection with the commercial production of farm products. Activities protected from nuisance suits include odors; dust; fumes; use of roads, drains, and canals; keeping of bees for production or apiculture; the employment and use of labor; the use of drains and waterways; and the “prevention of trespass. Protected activities also include the use of new practices and equipment consistent with technological development within the agricultural industry.5 The law explicitly protects the “conversion from one agricultural activity to another” as well as “new practices and equipment consistent with technological development within the agricultural industry.”6 Protected farms include land, buildings, freshwater ponds, and freshwater culturing and growing facilities, as well as machinery used in commercial production of farm products. Farm products are defined similarly broadly, encompassing dairy, forages, poultry, livestock, vegetables, trees, fish, and related products, as well as food, feed, fiber, or fur.7

While the processing plant and CAFO technically fit within the definition of agricultural activities, the state’s supreme court gave more weight to the legislative intent behind the state’s RTF law.8 In 1998, the court held that the Washington State Legislature did not protect all agricultural uses but rather those in urbanizing areas. Further, the court suggested that the law is designed to protect agricultural uses that were there first. The court offered that the RTF act “must be applied cautiously and narrowly.” Nonetheless, as recently as 2019, over two decades after the first nuisance suit was filed, Tyson, IBP, and Simplot continue to attempt to dismiss a case brought by the Buchanans, which calls for the nuisance-causing activities to stop and also claims damages.9

Washington’s broad language in its RTF law provides protection to larger operations, even those that do not necessarily appear at first glance to be a farm. For example, a landfill that operated as an indoor composting facility for a mushroom farm successfully qualified as a “farm.”10 Homeowners near the landfill sued, claiming that hazardous substances and odors were being released from the landfill that interfered with their use of their land. The court ruled that the operation did indeed qualify as a “farm” and merited RTF protection. The court stated, “Since mushrooms are farm products, the ICF [indoor composting facility], which produces compost for the mushrooms to grow [in], is an ‘agricultural activity’ because it is an ‘activity which occurs . . . in connection with the commercial production of farm products .. and includes … odors.’ Mushrooms cannot grow without the compost and, therefore, the compost activities cannot be separated from the mushroom growing.”11

Conditions and Activities

Washington’s protection of farming activities and forestry practices from nuisance suits remains subject to a few conditions. They must be established prior to surrounding nonagricultural and nonforestry activities. The RTF law states that such practices must be “good,” which are then presumed to be reasonable and warrant protection.12 The law treats “good” as conforming with applicable laws and rules.13 Accordingly, some activities that qualify as forestry practices—like a quarry—can lose RTF protection if they violate water quality laws.14

Amendments in 1992 afforded agricultural activities complying with the law unlimited operational hours, regardless of the hours of the day or night or day of the week.15 As one news article put it, “Farmers could drive their tractors or run their combines in the middle of the night.”16 But the amendments also introduced a much broader definition of agriculture, which from then forward included the commercial production of farm products—not just crops—opening up protections to all kinds of processing activities.17 However, RTF protections do not apply if the activity or practice has a substantial adverse effect on public health and safety.18

The 1992 amendments also afforded RTF protections to forestry, so long as a forestry operation was established before surrounding nonagricultural activities. Forestry practices protected from nuisance suits now include those conducted on or directly pertaining to forestland, which include growing, harvesting, or processing timber.19 Members of a residential community sued their uphill neighbor, the Seattle Gymnastics Society, after it clear-cut timber on its property as part of repairing a ski lodge, which led to an avalanche.20 The gymnastics society attempted to use the RTF defense. The lower court ruled in favor of the downhill landowners, and the gymnastics society appealed.21 The court of appeals reversed this on grounds that the gymnastics society had been engaged in forestry practices, in general, since long before the residential community members obtained their property, such as the growing of trees. On further appeal, the state supreme court ruled that mere ownership of the land, without proof that the uphill neighbor was engaging in an actual forestry activity prior to the development of neighboring residential uses, the clear-cutting of timber could not be protected by the RTF law.22

Similarly, a court ruled that an apple orchard’s use of propane cannons and cherry guns—while a new and expanded activity—was not exempt from a nuisance action. The homeowners, who were established prior to the surrounding nonagricultural activities, thus could move forward with their nuisance suit.23

Local Governance

Washington’s RTF law can limit a municipality’s ability to stop certain agricultural practices if considered nuisances, but not trespass. For example, an appeals court considered whether the discharge of excess irrigation water by an orchard was protected by the RTF law.24 In the case, water drainage from the orchard “fouled” a well on a private residence that was developed after the establishment of the orchard. Later, runoff from the orchard exposed a city sanitary water line, and the city as well as the Kiona Irrigation District sought to stop the orchard’s irrigation practice through an injunction. The court ruled that the RTF law did not protect the orchard because the discharge of water was off-site trespass and categorically different. However, the court nonetheless ruled the orchard was only partially responsible, and thus the injunction needed to be revisited.25

Otherwise, the RTF law does not explicitly address the power of local government. Some Washington counties have passed their own RTF laws that typically expand the exceptions provided to agriculture.26

Attorney Fees and Investigation Costs

Washington’s law was amended in 2005 to award attorney fees to those engaged in agricultural activities that successfully defend themselves against a nuisance claim.27 However, this legal language does not work the other way around, which discourages the filing of nuisance suits.28 A “farmer” who prevails in an action where an agricultural activity was claimed to be a nuisance can recover the full costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the farmer as a result of the lawsuit. In addition, a farmer who prevails in any claim based on an allegation that the agricultural activity on a farm violated laws, rules, or ordinances may recover the full costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the farmer.29 While “farm,” “farmland,” and “farm products” are defined by the law, “farmer” is not, making it unclear if any entity engaged in agricultural or forestry activities is eligible.

The costs that farmers can recover include (1) actual damages (including lost revenue and the replacement value of crops or livestock damaged or unable to be harvested as a result of the claim); (2) reasonable attorney fees and costs; and (3) exemplary damages if a court finds that the claim was initiated maliciously and without probable cause.30

However, defendants cannot recover fees and costs from governmental entities pursuing enforcement.31 Nonetheless, state and local agencies can recover their investigative costs and expenses if a court finds that the entity filing the complaint did so maliciously or without probable cause.32 Like the curbing of the filing of nuisance suits, such language also discourages the formal filing of complaints against agricultural or forestry operations.

  • 1. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.300 (2021).
  • 2. U.S. Department of Agriculture, USDA Quick Stats Tool: June 1979 Survey, Washington, distributed by National Agricultural Statistics Service, accessed January 6, 2021, https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/AA1C6DD1-7BD3-3ADE-89F4-DE0F01C7FBBB; “2021 State Agriculture Overview: Washington,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, accessed October 21, 2022, https://www.nass.usda.gov/Quick_Stats/Ag_Overview/stateOverview.php?state=WASHINGTON.
  • 3. Wash. Rev. Code. § 7.48.010 (2021). See also Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 134 Wash.2d 673, 687 (Wash. 1998).
  • 4. Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. Partnership, 952 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1998).
  • 5. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.310(1) (2021).
  • 6. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.310(1) (2021).
  • 7. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.310(2), (4) (2021).
  • 8. Buchanan, 952 P.2d 610.
  • 9. Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, LLC, No. 4:19-CV-5209-TOR, 2019 WL 7763826 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2019).
  • 10. Vicwood Meridian P’ship v. Skagit Sand and Gravel, 98 P.3d 1277 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
  • 11. Vicwood Meridian P’ship, 98 P.3d 1277.
  • 12. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.305(1)–(2) (2021).
  • 13. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.305(2) (2021).
  • 14. Gill v. LDI, 19 F.Supp.2d 1188 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
  • 15. 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 151 (S.H.B. 2457) (amending, in relevant part, Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.305).
  • 16. World Staff Writer, “Senate Gives Farmers Even More Rights,” Wenatchee (Wash.) World, March 4, 1992.
  • 17. World Staff Writer, “Senate Gives Farmers Even More Rights.”
  • 18. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.305(1) (2021).
  • 19. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.310(5) (2021) (as amended by 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 52 [H.B. 2330] and 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 200 [S.B. 5562]).
  • 20. Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc., 111 P.3d 257 (Wash. 2005).
  • 21. Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc., 86 P.3d 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
  • 22. Alpental Cmty. Club, 111 P.3d 257.
  • 23. Davis v. Taylor, 132 P.3d 783 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
  • 24. City of Benton City v. Adrian, 748 P.2d 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
  • 25. Adrian, 748 P.2d 679.
  • 26. Paul Lavigne Sullivan, “Pierce County Considers Law to Protect Its Farmers—Urban vs. Rural: As Homes Encroach on Land, County Ponders Law to Safeguard Farm Practices,” Tacoma News Tribune, August 31, 2001; Steven Friederich, “Outgoing Commissioners Will Take Up ‘Right to Farm’ Law,” Aberdeen (Wash.) Daily World, December 27, 2012; Steven Friederich, “Right to Farm Discussion Revived,” Aberdeen Daily World, February 14, 2012.
  • 27. 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 511 (S.B. 5962) (enacting, in relevant part, what is now Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.315).
  • 28. Cordon M. Smart, “The ‘Right to Commit Nuisance’ in North Carolina: A Historical Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act,” North Carolina Law Review 94, no. 6 (2016): 2097–154; Kyle Silk-Eglit, “The Fundamentals of the Right to Farm Act,” Wenatchee World, May 1, 2012.
  • 29. Wash. Rev Code § 7.48.315(1)–(2) (2021).
  • 30. Wash. Rev Code § 7.48.315(3)–(4) (2021).
  • 31. Wash. Rev Code § 7.48.315(5) (2021).
  • 32. Wash. Rev Code § 7.48.320 (2021)